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Summary 
This paper explores the role of the Ciceronian tradition in the radical religious discourse of 
John Toland (1670-1722).  Toland produced numerous works seeking to challenge the 
authority of the clergy, condemning their ‘priestcraft’ as a significant threat to the integrity of 
the Commonwealth.  Throughout these anticlerical writings, Toland repeatedly invoked Cicero 
as an enemy to superstition and as a religious sceptic, particularly citing the theological 
dialogues De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione.  This paper argues that Toland adapted the 
Ciceronian tradition so that it could function as an active influence on the construction of his 
radical discourse.  First, it shows that Toland championed a particular interpretation of Cicero’s 
works which legitimised his use of Cicero in this rational context.  Then, it shows the practical 
manifestations of this interpretation, examining the ramifications for how Toland formed three 
important facets of his campaign against priestcraft: his identification of priestcraft as a 
superstition; his argument for a rational religion in which priestcraft could play no role; and his 
portrayal of anticlericalism as a service to the Commonwealth.   
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1. Introduction 
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In Early Enlightenment England there was little that was safe from the approaching storm of 
radicalism: the divine right of Kings had already succumbed to an increasingly constitutional 
government, and the traditional authority of the Church was under sustained attack.  This 
produced a frenzied intellectual exchange, as concerned parties debated the impeachability of 
the Scripture, the respective merits of reason and faith, and the validity of the power of the 
Church and its clergy.  The seemingly inevitable conclusion, and one reached by many 
scholars, is that these efforts to confront religious traditions constituted a vital element of the 
‘Radical Enlightenment’ narrative.1  These scholars argue that the discourse coheres to their 
model of a radical ideology, in which faith, tradition, and authority were jettisoned in favour 
of reason.  This interpretation has been the subject of dispute, as scholars continue to identify 
numerous intellectual and cultural influences on the development of the Enlightenment, many 
of which display continuity with preceding traditions.2  The presence of an influential 
Ciceronian tradition contributes a further challenge, potentially reshaping how this religious 
discourse is understood. 
 John Toland (1670-1722) was one of the foremost contributors to this radical religious 
discourse, directing his polemic against any and every attempt by the Church to impede man’s 
reason or liberty.  Toland deemed the biggest danger to be the authority of the clergy, and 
                                                          
1 This narrative can be traced to Paul Hazard, The European Mind 1680-1715, translated by J. Lewis May, 
(London, 1953), but has been particularly developed in the works of Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical 
Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London, 1981) and Jonathan I. Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment: philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford, 2001). 
2 Jon Parkin and Timothy Stanton, Natural Law and Toleration in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford, 2013) 
demonstrate continuity with the natural law theory of the seventeenth century, while J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism 
and Religion, volume I: the Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737-1764, 5 vols (Cambridge, 2004) and Hugh 
Trevor-Roper, The Crisis of the Seventeenth-Century: religion, the Reformation, and social change (Indianapolis, 
1976) argued for the continuing influence of Erasmian scholarship on the formation of religious radicalism, and 
Anthony Grafton, Defenders of the Text: the traditions of scholarship in an age of science, 1450-1800 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991) has shown that humanist scholarship remained a powerful intellectual tool.  
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consequently committed himself to waging war against priestcraft.3  Toland reviled the clergy 
as a threat to the Commonwealth; it used its authority to hinder liberty in both the civil and 
spiritual spheres, and to further perpetuate its own power by championing absolutist rule.4  
Toland’s condemnation of the clergy’s support of the tyrant Charles II expresses this well: ‘the 
Pulpits immediatly sounded with nothing else but Passive Obedience and Non-resistance to all 
the King’s Commands, of what nature soever under the pain of Eternal Damnation; that if our 
Property, Religion, or Lives should be attack’d by him, we must have recourse to no defence 
but Prayers and Tears; and that Monarchy as well as Episcopacy was of Divine Right, with the 
like extravagant Doctrins’.5  The clergy's power, and pursuit of further power, threatened the 
                                                          
3 On this notion of 'priestcraft' and its place in Early Enlightenment England see Justin Champion, The Pillars of 
Priestcraft Shaken: the Church of England and its Enemies, 1660-1730 (Cambridge, 1992), 1-24, 173-179, 
Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696-1722 (Manchester, 2003), 97; Blair 
Worden, 'English Republicanism', in James H. Burns and Mark Goldie, The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought, 1450-1700 (Cambridge, 1991), 473; Mark Goldie, 'Priestcraft and the Birth of Whiggism', in Nicholas 
Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge, 1993), 209-211; 
Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution (Cambridge, 2004), 41-
44. 
4 On the clergy and civil tyranny see Mark Goldie, 'The Civil Religion of James Harrington' in Anthony Pagden, 
The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1987), 197-206, 212-218, and Goldie, 
'Priestcraft', in Phillipson and Skinner, Political Discourse, 212; Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft, 173-179, 
Republican Learning, 247, and '"Religion's safe, with Priestcraft is the War": Augustan Anticlericalism and the 
Legacy of the English Revolution, 1660-1720', The European Legacy, 5.4 (2000), 549-551; Scott, Commonwealth 
Principles, 49-54. On this concept of a spiritual tyranny see Goldie, ‘Priestcraft’, in Phillipson and Skinner, 
Political Discourse, 220; Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft, 137-160 and Republican Learning, 83, 245, 249-251; 
Richard Popkin and Mark Goldie, 'Scepticism, Priestcraft, and Toleration', in Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, 
The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge, 2006), 85; Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment, xvii-xviii.  On the role of the Church in society see Jeremy Gregory, 'The Eighteenth-Century 
Reformation: the pastoral task of Anglican clergy after 1689', in John Walsh, Colin Haydon, and Stephen Taylor, 
The Church of England c. 1689-c. 1833 (Cambridge, 1993), 67-85. 
5 John Toland, The Art of Governing by Partys (London, 1701), 14-15; cf. John Toland Anglia Libera (London, 
1701), 11-31, Reasons for Naturalising the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland, on the same foot with all other 
Nations (London, 1714), 36, The Life of John Milton (London, 1698), 83, Amyntor: or, a defence of Milton's Life 
(London, 1699), 103-104. 
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integrity of the Commonwealth and the virtue of its citizenry to a far greater extent than any 
political machinations.  This threat needed to be eliminated, and it was in pursuit of this that 
Toland particularly earned his radical reputation. 
 Notable throughout this campaign against the authority of the clergy was Toland’s 
reliance on the Ciceronian tradition for inspiration and guidance.6  In Cicero Illustratus, a work 
which proposed a new edition of Cicero’s complete works, Toland said of Cicero ‘profectò 
prae cunctis mortalibus Superstitionis malleus dici poterat’.7  Not an isolated event, Cicero as 
malleus Superstitionis featured throughout Toland’s works.  Often cited was a passage which 
appeared towards the end of the second book of De Divinatione in which Cicero seemingly 
declared his own war on superstition: 
Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio, fusa per gentis, oppressit omnium fere animos atque 
hominum imbecillitatem occupavit.  Quod et in eis libris dictum est qui sunt de Natura 
Deorum, et hac disputatione id maxime egimus.  Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et 
nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus sustulissemus.  Nec vero – id enim 
diligenter intellegi volo – superstitione tollenda religio tollitur.  Nam et maiorum 
instituta tueri sacris caerimoniisque retinendis sapientis est, et esse praestantem aliquam 
aeternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi 
pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum caelestium cogit confiteri.  Quam ob rem, ut religio 
                                                          
6 It was not solely in Toland's religious discourse that Cicero featured prominently,  as he drew on Cicero's 
works for material in his political and scholarly works as well, in particular when seeking to champion 
republican principles.  See, for example, the frontispiece of John Toland, ed., The Oceana of James Harrington, 
and his other works, (London, 1700), which cites Cicero's definition of a res publica from De Republica, III.43-
45, a definition also quoted in full in John Toland, Vindicius Liberius (London, 1702), 142-144. 
7 John Toland, Cicero Illustratus, dissertatio philologico-critica  (London, 1712), 59: ‘truly [he] can be called the 
hammer of Superstition before all mortals’. 
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propaganda etiam est, quae est iuncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes 
omnes eiiciendae.8   
Toland’s repeated invocations of this passage affirm that he was eager to identify Cicero with 
the sentiments contained therein, a characterisation of Cicero which allowed Toland to deploy 
him in the radical context of his own religious works.9  From Toland’s Two Essays, written in 
1695 on the questions of creation and the rise of fables, to his Pantheisticon in 1720, in which 
he detailed his ideal Pantheistic religion, Toland drew on Cicero, particularly De Natura 
Deorum and De Divinatione, for philosophical strategies and historical evidence to support his 
theories.  Cicero's role in Pantheisticon was so pronounced, his words providing the majority 
of the pseudo-liturgy contained therein, that he assumed an almost priestly role in Toland's 
theology. 
 In spite of the prominent role assumed by the Ciceronian tradition in Toland’s radical 
discourse, it has been all but ignored in scholarship addressing the intellectual forces at work 
                                                          
8 Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, translated by W. A. Falconer (London, 1927), 537,  (De 
Divinatione, II.148-149): ‘Speaking frankly, superstition, which is widespread among the nations, has taken 
advantage of human weakness to cast its spell over the mind of almost every man.  This same view was stated in 
my treatise On the Nature of the Gods; and to prove the correctness of that view has been the chief aim of the 
present discussion.  For I thought that I should be rendering a great service to myself and my country if I could 
tear this superstition up by the roots.  But I want it distinctly understood that the destruction of superstition does 
not mean the destruction of religion.  For I consider it the part of wisdom to preserve the institutions of our 
forefathers by retaining their sacred rites and ceremonies.  Furthermore, the celestial order and the beauty of the 
universe compel me to confess that there is some excellent and eternal Being, who deserves the respect and 
homage of men.  Wherefore, just as it is a duty to extend the influence of true religion, which is closely associated 
with the knowledge of nature, so it is a duty to weed out every root of superstition’. 
9 John Toland, Adeisidaemon, sive Titus Livius a superstitione vindicatus. Annexae sunt ejusdem Origines 
Judiciae (Hagae-Comitis, 1709), on the frontispiece of which appeared an excerpt.  The passage was also quoted 
in Origines Judiciae, 101-103, the partner work of Adeisidaemon, and in Pantheisticon, sive formula Celebrandae 
Sodalitatis Socraticae, In Tres Particulas Divisa; quae Pantheistarum, sive Sodalium, Continet I, Mores et 
Axiomata: II, Numen et Philosophiam: III, Libertatem, et non fallentem Legem, Neque fallendam (Cosmopoli, 
1720), 69-70. 
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here.10  This article will attempt to redress that omission, by demonstrating first that Toland 
deliberately championed a method of reading Cicero which would justify his extensive use of 
the tradition in a radical context, then exploring the practical results of this reading in how 
Toland constructed his discourse.  It will consequently challenge the assumption that a radical 
discourse necessitated the rejection of tradition and authority, an assumption which has 
dominated treatments of the Early Enlightenment. 
2. Interpreting Ciceronian Theology 
Toland’s desire to integrate the Ciceronian tradition into a radical religious discourse was not 
without its difficulties.  There was an ambiguity to Cicero’s primary theological works, De 
Natura Deorum and De Divinatione, which made their interpretation controversial.  This 
ambiguity emanated from the works’ composition as dialogues; De Natura Deorum allowed 
the characters of Velleius, Balbus, and Cotta to articulate the views of the Epicureans, Stoics, 
and Academics respectively, meanwhile De Divinatione saw Quintus Cicero make the Stoic 
case for divination in the first book, while Marcus Cicero used Academic Scepticism to refute 
that case in the second book.  Questions inevitably arose concerning the location of Cicero’s 
voice in these dialogues.  Should Cicero automatically be identified with the character 
articulating the views of the Academic Sceptics, the school with which Cicero identified 
himself in life?11  In De Natura Deorum, surely Cicero makes his own views clear at the end 
of book three, when under his own name he concedes the day to the Stoics, or was this simply 
a slight of hand to protect himself against the wroth of the faithful?  Indeed, is there any merit 
                                                          
10 Exceptions are Tadeusz Zieliński, Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte (Leipzig, 1929) and Günther Gawlick, 
‘Cicero and the Enlightenment’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (1963), 657-682, which offer 
important but schematic and outdated surveys of the Ciceronian tradition in the Enlightenment.  Matthew Fox, 
Cicero’s Philosophy of History (Oxford, 2007) attempts to examine the influence of Ciceronian rhetoric in the 
Enlightenment. 
11 See, for example, Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.11. 
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in seeking Cicero’s voice at all, or should the works be read as a demonstration of the Academic 
method, presenting the different sides of a question and leaving it to the reader to draw their 
own conclusions? 
 The confusion engendered by this ambiguity regarding Cicero’s voice permeated the 
religious discourse of Early Modern England.  There were those within the established Church 
who sought in De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione a Cicero whose views were conducive 
to their own orthodox understanding of Christianity.12  These clergymen identified Cicero with 
the statements made under his own name in De Natura Deorum, and hence with the conclusion 
which suggested that he concurred with the views of the Stoic Balbus.  This enabled them to 
identify Cicero as an advocate of such points of orthodoxy as divine providence, and hence 
revelation, and universal consent.13  Richard Bentley, renowned classicist and theologian, in 
his response to the notorious Freethinker Anthony Collins' work Discourse on Free-thinking, 
elaborated on how Cicero ought to be read to enable these conclusions: ‘if we seek therefore 
Cicero’s true Sentiments; it must not be in his Disputes against Others, where he has licence to 
say any thing for opposition sake: but in the Books where he dogmatizes himself; where 
                                                          
12 This was primarily confined to so-called ‘rational’ Anglicans who, influenced by Newtonianism, attempted to 
cohere natural religion with their orthodoxy; referred to as ‘Low Churchmen’ and ‘Latitudinarians’, they counted 
among their number Samuel Clarke, Ralph Cudworth, and Richard Bentley.  The problem of determining 
appropriate terminology for discussing these men, particularly the ‘rationalism’ of their ideas, is discussed by 
John Spurr, '"Rational Religion" in Restoration England', Journal of the History of Ideas, 49.4 (1988), particularly 
569-581.  Regarding this movement within the Church see Margaret Jacob, The Newtonians and the English 
Revolution, 1689-1720 (Hassocks, 1976), 15-21; Gerald Cragg, The Church and the Age of Reason, 1648-1789 
(Harmondsworth, 1960), 65-80; Gawlick, 'Cicero in the Enlightenment', 662; Brian Young, 'Conyers Middleton: 
the historical consequences of heterodoxy', in S. Mortimer and J. Robertson, The Intellectual Consequences of 
Religious Heterodoxy, c. 1600-1750 (Leiden, 2012), 238; Peter Harrison, 'Religion' and the Religions in the 
English Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1990), 5-7. 
13 As is done by Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and 
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, third edition, (London, 1711), 18-19 and John Wilkins, Of the 
Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London, 1675), I.218. 
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allowing for the word Probable, you have all the Spirit and the Marrow of the Platonic, 
Peripatetic, and Stoic Systemes’.14  The process by which Cicero could be made a viable tool 
for these clergymen therefore becomes evident: he must be identified with the views stated 
under his own name in favour of Stoic theology, and his identification of these views as 
probabile must be equated with dogmatic support. 
An alternative reading was championed by those who sought to recruit Cicero as a 
mouthpiece for heterodoxy: simply identify as Ciceronian the views expressed by the character 
of the Academic Sceptic in the dialogues.  Anthony Collins made this case most explicitly in 
the Discourse of Freethinking, published in 1713, in which he identified Cicero as a fellow 
Freethinker: ‘the true method of discovering the Sentiments of CICERO, is to see what he says 
himself, or under the Person of an Academick...And if CICERO’s Readers will follow this Rule 
of common Sense in understanding him, they will find him as great a Free-Thinker as he was 
a Philosopher, an Orator, a Man of Virtue, and a Patriot’.15  This reading made Cicero’s 
defining characteristic his scepticism, his desire to challenge all dogma.16  Cicero could 
consequently be invoked by heterodox writers, who would cite as Ciceronian arguments made 
against divine providence and intervention, against a God who could act outside the laws of 
nature and reason.17  Among the heterodox, particularly the radical Deists and Freethinkers, it 
                                                          
14 Richard Bentley, Remarks Upon a late Discourse of Free-Thinking (London, 1713), II.81-82; cf. Ralph 
Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), I.434. 
15 Anthony Collins, A Discourse of Free-Thinking (London, 1713), 139. 
16 On the previous influence of Cicero’s scepticism see Anthony Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, 
Sceptics (London, 1974), 232-248; Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle (New 
York, 2003), 28-35; Charles Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus: a study of the influence of the Academica in the 
Renaissance (The Hague, 1972).  On its future influence on Hume see Peter S. Fosl, 'Doubt and Divinity: Cicero's 
influence on Hume's religious scepticism', Hume Studies, XX.1 (1994), 103-120. 
17 Anthony Collins, Discourse, 135-136; cf. Matthew Tindal, Christianity as old as the creation: or, The Gospel, 
a Republication of the Religion of Nature (London, 1730), iv and Charles Blount, Anima Mundi: or, an Historical 
Narration of the Opinions of the Ancients, concerning Man's Soul after this Life (London, 1679), 10-11, 33.  On 
the efforts of Deists to make the case against divine providence and revelation see James Herrick, The Radical 
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was the sceptical arguments in De Divinatione and De Natura Deorum that could be called 
Ciceronian. 
 Toland’s awareness of these disputes concerning how Cicero’s religious texts should 
be read is made apparent in Cicero Illustratus, in which he condemns those among his 
contemporaries who cited as Ciceronian views which were not in fact his own: ‘non Cicero, 
qui haec aspernatur, citari debuit, sed Velleius Epicureus apud Ciceronem, Balbus Stoicus apud 
Ciceronem, et sic de aliis’.18  For Toland, there was no doubt as to where the true Ciceronian 
voice was located.  Cicero was Cotta, the Academic; the conclusion of De Natura Deorum was 
an attempt to protect himself from those Toland likens to the censors of the Catholic Church.19  
Cicero presented his scepticism under his own name in De Divinatione; the passage at the 
conclusion of the second book so prized by Toland was an unassailable clarification of his 
beliefs.20  Toland permits no prevarication on this reading; the truly Ciceronian views within 
De Natura Deorum and De Divinatione are those of an Academic Sceptic.  This identification 
of Cicero with the sceptical views articulated in his works justified, Toland was able to deploy 
this Cicero in his own endeavours.  The practical ramifications of this can be discerned in how 
three vital aspects of Toland’s anticlerical campaign were addressed: the definition of 
superstition; the nature of religion; and the role of a civil religion. 
 
3. Priestcraft as a Ciceronian Superstitio 
                                                          
Rhetoric of the English Deists: the discourse of skepticism, 1680-1750 (Columbia, 1997), 26-36; Roger D. Lund, 
The Margins of Orthodoxy: Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660-1750 (Cambridge, 1995), 1-32; 
Jacob, The Newtonians, 201-250; Cragg, The Church, 65-80; Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 360-363, 599-627. 
18 John Toland, Cicero Illustratus, 37: ‘Cicero, who rejected these things, ought not to be cited, but Velleius the 
Epicurean in Cicero, Balbus the Stoic in Cicero, and in the same way about other things’. 
19 John Toland, Cicero Illustratus, 37-38. 
20 John Toland, Cicero Illustratus, 38. 
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As noted, Toland demonstrated throughout his works a particular affinity with the passage 
towards the end of De Divinatione, which he deemed Cicero’s most conclusive statement of 
his religious views.  In that concluding passage, Cicero made an impassioned pledge to 
‘superstitionis stirpes omnes eiiciendae’.21  This Ciceronian superstitio, and the campaign 
against it in the theological texts, attained a high status in Toland’s discourse.  He identified in 
it a definition of superstition and a justification for its elimination which he could direct against 
priestcraft.   
3.1. The Origins of Superstition 
At the end of De Divinatione Cicero provided a clear indication of the source of superstitio: 
‘nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitio, fusa per gentis, oppressit omnium fere animos atque 
hominum imbecillitatem occupavit’.22  The origin of superstition in the weaknesses of men’s 
minds, their irrationality and fear, was of the utmost importance to Cicero’s approach.  In De 
Divinatione Cicero often identified the mental frailty of men as the target of divinatory 
practices: ‘quid mirum igitur, si in auspiciis et in omni divinatione imbecilli animi superstitiosa 
ista concipiant, verum dispicere non possint?’.23  Cicero extended this argument to condemn 
those who deliberately exploited such irrationality with the invention of practices like 
divination, designed to not only manipulate man’s weakness, but to perpetuate it by 
maintaining the irrational fear of the gods which was its basis.24  Superstition grew from the 
                                                          
21 Cicero, De Divinatione, 537, (II.149): 'so it is a duty to weed out every root of superstition'. 
22 Cicero, De Divinatione, 537, (II.148): 'Speaking frankly, superstition, which is widespread among the nations, 
has taken advantage over human weakness to cast its spell over the mind of almost every man'. 
23 Cicero, De Divinatione, 463, (II.81): ‘what wonder, then, if in auspices and in every kind of divination weak 
minds should adopt the superstitious practices which you have mentioned and should be unable to discern the 
truth?’; cf. De Divinatione, II.19, 83, 85, 86, 100, 125, 129.  See Dale B. Martin, Inventing Superstition: from the 
Hippocratics to the Christians (Cambridge Mass., 2004), 127-128. 
24 Cicero, De Divinatione, II.83-85. 
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irrationality of men, and was nurtured by those who sought to encourage and exploit that 
irrationality for their own purposes. 
This is an understanding of superstition which suits Toland’s own purposes absolutely.  
Throughout his works, Toland associates the origins of supersition and its power with the 
irrational fears of men.25  For example, Toland’s third Letter to Serena considers the origins of 
idolatry: ‘the fluctuating of mens Minds between Hope and Fear, is one of the chief Causes of 
Superstition: for being no way able to foresee the Event of what greatly concerns them, they 
now hope the best, and next minute fear the worst, which easily leads them not only to take 
any thing for a good or bad Omen, which happen’d to them in any former good luck or 
misfortune; but also to lay hold of any Advice, to consult Diviners and Astrologers’.26  The 
uncertainty of life, the fears and troubles which that introduces, creates weakness in the minds 
of men, making them susceptible to superstitious practices, which in turn further perpetuates 
their irrational fears.  Toland is able to direct this understanding of superstition against both the 
clergy as an institution, and sacerdotal authority, the basis of its power. 
3.2. The Origins of the Clergy 
In the preface of the Letters to Serena Toland reveals that a particular passage from Cicero’s 
De Legibus inspired the first letter in the collection: ‘sensus nostros non Parens, non Nutrix, 
non Magister, non Poeta, non Scena depravat, non multitudinis Consensus abducit: at vero 
                                                          
25 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 70; Clito: a poem on the force of eloquence (London, 1700), 18; ‘A Specimen of 
the Critical History of the Celtic religion and Learning: containing an Account of the Druids, &c.’, in Pierre Des 
Maizeaux, A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Toland (London, 1726), I.8-9, 140, 142-143; Amyntor, 38; 
Christianity not Mysterious (London, 1696), 44; An Appeal to Honest People Against Wicked Priests (London, 
1713), 16; The Art of Restoring (London, 1714), 29. 
26 John Toland, Letters to Serena (London, 1704), III.78. 
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Animis omnes tenduntur Insidiae’.27  Cicero sought to demonstrate that disagreements 
concerning justice emanate not from any flaw in reason or natural law, but from a failure among 
men to understand reason appropriately.  Toland explains that from this passage developed the 
subject of his first letter, on the origin of prejudices, ‘showing the successive Growth and 
Increase of Prejudices thro every step of our lives, and proving that all the Men in the World 
are join’d in the same Conspiracy to deprave the Reason of every individual Person’.28  In the 
first letter Toland pledged to identify the different ways in which man’s reason was being 
depraved, and to what end.  The connection to the clergy is forged here: ‘the strange things and 
amazing story’s we have read or heard (if of any Concern to a particular Religion) are daily 
confirm’d to us by the Preacher from the Pulpit, where all he says is taken for Truth by the 
greatest part of the Auditory, no body having the liberty to contradict him, and he giving out 
his own Conceits for the very Oracles of God’.29  It is the clergy which sets the most traps to 
undermine man’s irrationality. 
The clergy’s reasons for depraving man’s reason is linked by Toland to the theory of 
priestly imposture.  The third Letter to Serena explores the origins of idolatry, integrating an 
extensive account of the origins of priestly power.30  According to Toland’s history of idolatry, 
priests established their power by manipulating the fear of death which afflicted so many: ‘it 
                                                          
27 John Toland, Letters to Serena, preface, quoting Cicero, On the Commonwealth and the Laws, translated by 
James E. G. Zetzel, 122, (De Legibus I.47): ‘neither Parents or Nurse or Schoolmaster, or Poet, or Playhouse 
depraves our Senses, nor can the Consent of the Multitude mislead them: but all sorts of Traps are laid to seduce 
our Understandings’. 
28 John Toland, Letters to Serena, preface; cf. ‘Critical History’, Collection, I.140. 
29 John Toland, Letters to Serena, I.8. 
30 On the tradition of the theory of imposture see Harrison, 'Religion' and the Religions, 14-18, 73-77, and Justin 
Champion, ‘Legislators, impostors, and the politic origins of religion: English theories of ‘imposture’ from Stubbe 
to Toland’, in Silvia Berti, Françoise Charles-Daubert, and Richard H. Popkin, Heterodoxy, Spinozism, and Free 
Thought in Early-Eighteenth-Century Europe: studies on the Traité Des Trois Imposteurs (Dordrecht, 1996), 333-
356.   
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seems evident from the remotest Monuments of Learning, that all Superstition originally 
related to the Worship of the Dead, being principally deriv’d from Funeral Rites, tho the first 
occasion might be very innocent or laudable...but the Flatterers of great Men in the Persons of 
their Predecessors, the excessive Affection of Friends or Relations, and the Advantage which 
the Heathen Priests drew from the Credulity of the simple, carry’d this matter a great deal 
further’.31  Toland invokes Ciceronian evidence, particularly from the Tusculan Disputations, 
to support this thesis.32  Toland extends this argument to encompass the deification of 
inappropriate objects as vital to the progression of idolatry, primarily using the descriptions in 
De Natura Deorum of the efforts of the Stoics to expand the fear of the gods among the people 
through such means.33  According to Toland’s account, priests and others who sought power 
for themselves introduced rituals and false religious practices built on the fears and 
irrationalities of men.  The clergy’s desire to undermine reason therefore becomes clear, as 
their power was rooted in the irrationality of men. 
The contemporary clergy was perpetuating this deception in order to maintain the 
irrational fears which granted them power.34  Toland provides a catalogue of the clerical 
practices which can be classified as superstitions: ‘having given this summary Account, 
SERENA, of ancient and modern Heathenism, we may remark that almost every Point of those 
                                                          
31 John Toland, Letters to Serena, III.72-73; cf. Milton, pp. 91-92 and The Memorial of the State of England, in 
Vindication of the Queen, the Church, and the Administration (London, 1705), 6. 
32 John Toland, Letters to Serena, II.28, quotes Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, I.38; Letters to Serena, II.44-
46, quotes Tusculanae Disputationes, I.36; Letters to Serena, III.81-84, quotes Tusculanae Disputationes, I.37; 
Letters to Serena, III.84-87, quotes Tusculanae Disputationes, I.28-29. 
33 John Toland, Letters to Serena, III.72-74, quotes Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.62; Letters to Serena, III.77-
80, quotes Cicero, De Divinatione, II.4; Letters to Serena, III.87-90, quotes De Natura Deorum, II.60-61; Letters 
to Serena, III.90-93, quotes De Natura Deorum I.101; Letters to Serena, III.119-123, quotes De Natura Deorum, 
II.63. 
34 See Harrison, 'Religion' and the Religions, 77-85 and Euan Cameron, Enchanted Europe: superstition, reason, 
and religion, 1250-1750 (Oxford, 2010), 309 for further examples. 
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superstitious and idolatrous Religions are in these or grosser Circumstances reviv’d by many 
Christians in our Western Parts of the Word, and by all the Oriental Sects: as Sacrifices, 
Incense, Lights, Images, Lustrations, Feasts, Musick, Altars, Pilgrimages, Fastings, religious 
Celibacy and Habits, Consecrations, Divinations, Sorcerys, Omens, Presages, Charms, the 
Worship of dead Men and Women, a continual Canonization of more, Mediators between God 
and Men...’.35  This is an accusation repeated in An Appeal to Honest People against Wicked 
Priests, with Toland attacking the sacrament of the Eucharist, one of the two sacraments 
maintained in the Protestant faith, and elsewhere in his works.36   Toland was determined to 
show that the power of the clergy depended on the exacerbation and perpetuation of man’s 
irrational fears; in this way, their power became a superstitio by Ciceronian standards. 
3.3. The Irrationality of Sacerdotal Authority 
The second way in which Toland employs Ciceronian superstitio in his war against priestcraft 
is to discredit the core of priestly power, sacerdotal authority.  It is in this aspect of Toland’s 
war against priestcraft that Cicero’s sceptical assault on Stoic belief in divination in the second 
book of De Divinatione proves most useful.  Cicero is quite explicit that in opposition to the 
numerous examples provided by Quintus as evidence for divination, he will counter with ratio, 
the enemy of irrational superstitions: ‘argumentis et rationibus oportet, quare quidque ita sit, 
docere, non eventis, eis praesertim quibus mihi liceat non credere’.37  Cicero particularly rejects 
as irrational the belief that certain people are specially enabled as vessels for messages from 
                                                          
35 John Toland, Letters to Serena, III.127-128.  The catalogue Toland presents here has some resemblance to 
Hobbes’ description of pagan religious practices in Leviathan, XII.18-19. 
36 John Toland, Appeal, 37; cf. A Defence of Mr. Toland, in a Letter to Himself (London, 1697). 
37 Cicero, De Divinatione, 399-401, (II.27): ‘you ought to have employed arguments and reason to show that all 
your propositions were true and you ought not to have resorted to so-called occurrences – certainly not to such 
occurrences as are unworthy of belief’; cf. De Divinatione, II.86.  See Brian Krostenko, 'Beyond (Dis)belief: 
rhetorical form and religious symbols in Cicero's De Divinatione', Transactions of the American Philological 
Association, 130 (2000), 370-373, on the rhetorical significance of this ratio vs. exempla approach. 
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the divine, and capable of the interpretation of those messages.  This is particularly evident in 
his passages attacking the divinatory powers of dreams.38  Cicero’s rejection of the belief that 
the divine would communicate with selected individuals as an irrational superstition was of 
much use to Toland.     
  Toland employed this material in his Origines Judiciae, when he directed the 
Ciceronian denial of the divinatory power of dreams against the tradition that Moses was a 
vessel of divine knowledge.  Dreams merely conveyed a perception of that reality, not divine 
intelligence: ‘suntque inter doctorum doctiores qui omnes Dei Apparitiones, in Pentateucho et 
alibi relatas, ad Somnia et Extases constanter referunt: unde non nemo aiebat esse convertibilia, 
sive dixeris Abrahamo loquutum esse Deum in somnio, sive Abrahamum somniasse sibi 
loquutum esse Deum; sicuti de quodam Alexandri somnio scribens Cicero, non audivit (inquit) 
ille Draconem loquentem, sed est visus audire’.39  Toland also used Cicero to demonstrate the 
extent to which such claims to divine interpretation could be exploited for the acquisition of 
secular power, using Cicero’s quotation from Demosthenes describing the manipulation of an 
oracle by Philip: ‘ita Demosthenes (referente Cicerone) Pythiam Phillipizare dicebat, id est, 
quasi cum Philippo facere.  Hoc autem eo spectabat (addit ille) ut eam a Philippo corruptam 
                                                          
38 Cicero, De Divinatione, II.124-142. 
39 John Toland, Origines Judiciae, 167-168, quoting Cicero, De Divinatione, 527-529, (II.141): ‘and there are 
those among the more learned of learned men who having related every Apparition of God, in the Pentateuch and 
similar, constantly refer to Dreams and Ecstasies: from which some were saying that it was changeable, either you 
may have said that God spoke to Abraham in a dream, or that God spoke to him as he was daydreaming; just as 
Cicero wrote about a certain dream of Alexander, he did not hear the serpent speak, but thought he heard it’; cf. 
Toland, Two Essays sent in a letter from Oxford, to a nobleman in London (London, 1695), II.31-32.  See Keith 
Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
England (London, 1971), 128-146, on the role of dreams in the early Church. 
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diceret’.40  Toland’s appreciation of the Ciceronian arguments against the possibility of direct 
communications from the divine is evident. 
The appeal of these arguments in De Divinatione becomes further apparent when 
related to one of Toland’s foremost strategies in his war on priestcraft: exposure of sacerdotal 
authority as a superstition.  Sacerdotal authority essentially amounted to the claim that divine 
power could be interpreted by, even delegated into, the clergy; it was this authority, cited as de 
iure divino, that allowed priests to perform sacraments and liturgy, interpret the Bible, guide 
the laity, and which underwrote the apostolic succession.41  Toland attacked the idea of this 
divine authority of the clergy in his poem Clito, declaring ‘RELIGION’s safe, with 
PRIESTCRAFT is the War, All Friends to Priestcraft, Foes of Mankind are.  Their impious 
Fanes and Altars I’ll o’erthrow, And the whole Farce of their feign’d Saintship show’.42  
Toland’s doubts concerning the sacerdotal authority of the clergy are even more explicitly 
stated in his Christianity not Mysterious: ‘the Priests, but very rarely, and then obscurely, 
taught in publick, pretending the Injunctions of their Divinities to the contrary, lest their 
Secrets, forsooth, should be expos’d to the Profanation of the Ignorant, or Violation of the 
Impious...and it was inexpiable Sacrilege for any to enter these but such as had a special Mark 
and Privilege, or as much as to ask Questions about what passed in them.  All the Excluded 
                                                          
40 John Toland, Origines Judiciae, 171, quoting Cicero, De Divinatione, 505, (II.118): ‘in this way Demosthenes 
(as was quoted by Cicero) said that the Pythian priestess ‘philippized’, in other words, that she was Philip’s ally.  
By this he meant (he adds) that she had been bribed by Philip’. 
41 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, 25-77, on the changing role of ‘magic’ in the Church.  See also 
Harrison, 'Religion' and the Religions, 19-28; Goldie, 'Civil religion’, in Pagden, Languages of Political Theory, 
212-218; Champion, '"Religion's safe"', 550-551.  See Cameron, Enchanted Europe, 304-305, on sacerdotal 
authority as superstition in the broader tradition. 
42 John Toland, Clito, 16.   
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were for that Reason stil’d the Profane, as those not in Orders with us the Laity’.43  The 
supposed sacred power of the clergy was contrary to all reason, and hence could be categorised 
as a superstition. 
Toland's reading of Cicero's theological dialogues provided him with an understanding 
of superstition which was ideal for his campaign against priestcraft.  According to Cicero, 
superstitions were beliefs and practices whose power was based in the irrationality of men.  
According to Toland, the clergy’s power originated from and continued to rely upon 
irrationality.  There was no other conclusion but that priestcraft was a superstition. 
4. Rationalising Religion 
This identification of priestcraft as a superstition proves all the more pertinent when another 
key statement from Cicero is considered: ‘nec vero – id enim diligenter intellegi volo – 
superstitione tollenda religio tollitur’.44  Cicero is adamant that his attack on divination should 
not be misconstrued as an attack on religion, but should be appreciated as an attempt to purify 
irrational superstitions from religion.  Ciceronian religio plays a prominent role in this strategy, 
as Toland identified his ‘true’ religion with the rational religion he located in Cicero’s 
theological works. 
4.1. Ciceronian Reason 
According to Toland’s reading, Cicero could be identified with the characters of Cotta in De 
Natura Deorum and himself in De Divinatione, both of whom champion a rational, natural 
                                                          
43 John Toland, Christianity not Mysterious, 69; cf. 155-156, 164, and ‘The primitive Constitution of the Christian 
Church: with an Account of the principal Controversies about Church-Government, which at present divide the 
Christian World’, in Des Maizeaux, Collection, II.121-123. 
44 Cicero, De Divinatione, 537, (II.148): 'but I want it distinctly understood that the destruction of superstition 
does no mean the destruction of religion'; cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, I.117, II.71. 
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religion.  This is important for Toland, as throughout his works he made the case that religion 
should be rational.  In Pantheisticon, the work in which Toland explored his personal religion 
most extensively, he repeatedly identifies Pantheism with reason: ‘RATIO est vera et prima 
lex; Lux, lumenque vitae’.45  The members of this Pantheistic society are encouraged not to 
allow themselves to be deceived by anything which contradicts their reason, as it will be a 
superstition, and inconsistent with their true religion.  It is Cicero to whom Toland turns for a 
definition of the ratio which underpins his religion.  Obtained from the sixth book of 
Lactantius’ Divine Institutes, Toland quotes in full this paraphrase of the definition of right 
reason expounded by Laelius in the third book of De Republica, as he defended justice against 
the attack by Philus.46  There are two key qualities to right reason in this definition which make 
it particularly useful in the religious context Toland envisages: right reason is consonant with 
nature, and it is universal, accessible to all men.47  Toland concludes his quotation of this 
definition of reason with the statement that ‘Hac Lege institui regique volumus: Haudquaquam 
mendacibus, Et superstitiosis hominum commentis’.48  Anything to be included with the true 
religion must cohere with ratio; superstitions, defined by their irrationality, can therefore be 
safely eliminated, as inconsistent with the true religion. 
4.2.  A Natural Religion 
This first feature of true religion is stated clearly in the Ciceronian definition of reason quoted 
by Toland: ‘est quidem VERA LEX RECTA RATIO, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, 
                                                          
45 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 57: ‘REASON is the true and first Law, The Light and Splendour of Life’. 
46 Cicero, De Republica, III.33; preserved in Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones, 6.8.6-9.  Toland had already used 
this passage in full to define reason in Nazarenus: Or, Jewish, Gentile, and Mahometan Christianity (London, 
1718), I.179-180. 
47 See also John Toland, Two Essays, 2. 
48 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 68: ‘we are willing to be brought up, and governed by this Law, Not by the lying, 
and superstitious fictions of men’. 
19 
 
constans, sempiterna’.49  This is also in evidence in the conclusion of De Divinatione, when 
Cicero declares that the beauty of the universe may be taken as evidence of a divine being, and 
goes on to provide this description of religio: ‘quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est, 
quae est iuncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes eiiciendae’.50  This is 
an understanding of natural religion which proved intensely appealing to Toland, as the core 
belief of his natural philosophy Pantheism was the conflation of god and nature as one entity.51  
Toland drew on Cicero in order to illustrate this conception of the divine: ‘MOD. Carmen 
accinamus De natura UNIVERSI.  MOD & RESPONDI. “Quicquid est Hoc, omnia animat, 
Format, alit, auget, creat; Sepelit, recipitque in sese omnia: Omniumque idem est Pater; 
Indidemque omnia, quae oriuntur, De integro atque eodem occidunt”’.52  Toland’s Pantheism 
demanded coherence with the laws of nature. 
Within the ‘liturgy’ recorded in Pantheisticon, Toland quoted in full the account of 
Academic physics provided by Cicero in the Academics.53  According to this theory, influenced 
by Stoicism, nature and the universe are formed by matter, and a force animating that matter; 
                                                          
49 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 67-68, quoting Cicero, On the Commonwealth, 71, (De Republica, III.33): ‘true 
law is right reason, consonant with nature, spread through all people’. 
50 De Divinatione, 537, (II.148-149): 'wherefore, just as it is a duty to extend the influence of true religion, which 
is closely associated with the knowledge of nature, so it is a duty to weed out every root of superstition'. 
51 On Toland’s Pantheism see Jeffrey Wigelsworth, Deism in Enlightenment England: theology, politics, and 
Newtonian public science (Manchester, 2009), 143-147; Wayne Hudson, The English Deists: studies in Early 
Enlightenment (London, 2009), 92-94; Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 610-613; Justin Champion, ‘John Toland: 
the Politics of Pantheism’, Revue de Synthèse, 2-3 (1995), 259-280; Jacob, Radical Enlightenment,  60-62.  On 
Pantheism in general in this period see Michael Hunter, Science and Society in Restoration England (Cambridge, 
1981), 162-187; Jacob, Radical Enlightenment; Cragg, The Church, 37-49; Champion, ‘Politics of Pantheism’, 
278-279; Michael Levine, Pantheism: a non-theistic concept of deity (London, 1994), 47-70. 
52 Toland, Pantheisticon, 55, quoting Cicero, De Divinatione, 367, (I.131): ‘MOD. Let us sing a hymn, on the 
nature of the universe.  MOD & RESP. “Whate’er the power may be, it animates, Creates, gives form, increase, 
and nourishment To everything: of everything the sire, It takes all things unto itself and hides Within its breast; 
and as from it all things Arise, likewise to it all things return”’. 
53 Cicero, Academica, I.24-29, quoted in Pantheisticon, 58-61. 
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this force and matter must coexist for anything else to exist.  For the Stoics, the divine is the 
force which animates matter, and hence the universe and everything within it; they call this 
force alternately pneuma, providence, reason or necessity.54  The Academics, including Cotta, 
are satisfied by this physical account of the universe, in which nature and the divine are one.  
Toland was evidently also satisfied by this explanation, concluding the passage with an 
exclamation of its effective summation of the situation: ‘de natura EFFICIENTIS plus quàm 
EFFECTI, Non est cur imposterùm dubitemus’.55  The Stoic and Academic physical 
philosophy portrayed here in large part cohered with the materialist philosophy Toland had 
presented in his works, most extensively in the fourth and fifth of his Letters to Serena, and in 
the ‘Discourse’ which prefixed his Pantheisticon.  This philosophy established that the force 
animating the matter which constituted the universe was God. 
Integral to Toland’s Pantheism is the rejection of the idea that the divine could act 
outside the laws of nature, as it was one with nature; God cannot be viewed as distinct from 
the universe, and is hence governed by its laws.56  It is in this aspect of Pantheism that the 
character of Cotta in De Natura Deorum proves useful, as he provides the sceptical arguments 
directed against the Stoic belief in providence, a belief which also transgressed Toland’s 
Pantheism.  Balbus in De Natura Deorum articulates the Stoic case for divine providence: ‘nihil 
est autem praestantius deo; ab eo igitur mundum necesse est regi; nulli igitur est naturae 
oboediens aut subiectus deus, omnem ergo regit ipse naturam’.57  The arguments made by Cotta 
                                                          
54 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II.45-72; cf. Andrew Lintott, Cicero as Evidence: a historian’s companion (Oxford, 
2008), 350-358. 
55 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 61: ‘the nature of the efficient, no more than that of the effect, leaves us no room 
for doubt’.   
56 Wigelsworth, Deism, 146-147; Levine, Pantheism,  93-112. 
57 Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, Academica, translated by H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., 1933), 197-199, 
(De Natura Deorum, II.77): ‘but as a matter of fact nothing exists that is superior to god; it follows therefore that 
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to challenge this Stoic conception of the divine are all directed against the elevation of the 
divine above nature.58  Cotta attempted to liberate nature from Stoic divine reason, arguing that 
reason and the patterns of nature belonged to nature itself: ‘illud non probabam, quod negabas 
id accidere potuisse nisi ea uno divino spiritu contineretur.  Illa vero cohaeret et permanet 
naturae viribus, non deorum’.59  While the greater portion of Cotta’s refutation of divine 
providence was lost, or destroyed, sufficient material remains to confirm his rejection of the 
belief that a divine force could surpass or overrule the laws of nature.  In this way, Toland drew 
on the representation of natural religion in Cicero’s works and deployed it as a means of testing 
religious beliefs; those that transgressed the laws of nature could not be part of a true religion.   
4.3. A Universal Religion 
The second feature of this true religion was that it should be accessible to the reason of all men: 
‘neque est quaerendus Explanator, aut Interpres ejus alius; nec erit alia Lex Romae, alia 
Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac: sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una Lex, et sempiterna 
et immortalis, continebit’.60  Those elements of religion which contravene this can therefore be 
considered superstitions superfluous to religion.  Toland makes this a fundamental feature of 
his Pantheism.  First, he states through the ‘liturgy’ in Pantheisticon his rejection of the 
inventions of men: ‘MOD.: Non clarae sunt fictae Leges, nec universales, Non semper eaedem, 
                                                          
the world is ruled by him; therefore god is not obedient or subject to any form of nature, and therefore he himself 
rules all nature’. 
58 David Fott, ‘The politico-philosophical character of Cicero’s verdict in De Natura Deorum’, in Walter 
Nicgorski, Cicero’s Practical Philosophy (Notre Dame, 2012), 163-168. 
59 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, III.28: ‘but I could not accept your assertion that this could not have come about 
were it not held together by a single divine breath.  On the contrary, the system’s coherence and persistence is due 
to nature’s forces and not to divine power’. 
60 Cicero, De Republica, III.33, quoted in Pantheisticon, 68: ‘there will not be one law at Rome and another at 
Athens, one now and another later; but all nations at all times will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable 
law’. 
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nec efficaces unquam: RESP.: Paucis ergò, aut oppidò nullis sunt utiles, Solis exceptis 
INTERPRETIBUS’.61  He then describes the accessibility fundamental to the Pantheistic 
religion: ‘religionem eorum animadvertas simplicem, claram, facilem, intemeratam, et 
gratuitam; non fucatam, implicitam, operosam, incomprehensibilem, aut mercenariam’.62  As 
any true, rational religion should be, Pantheism is fully accessible to all men. 
Integral to this is the argument that religious knowledge existed in the state of nature, 
prior to the intervention of established religion and priests.63  The existence of a primitive 
religion was an historical argument used regularly by Toland to challenge Christian orthodox 
history.64  This argument for the existence of religion in the state of nature features in the second 
of the Letters to Serena, dealing with the immortality of the soul, and the earlier parts of the 
third letter, dealing with the origins of idolatry.  In these sections Toland proves, by appealing 
to historical evidence including that provided by Cicero, that awareness of the immortality of 
the soul was acquired without the aid of revelation or priestly knowledge.65  In the absence of 
depravers of reason, primitive men were able to develop a simplistic form of religion in no way 
reliant on rites, images, or any other practices associated with priestcraft.  It was the corruption 
of this practice which introduced superstition to the world: ‘I shall only endeavour to show by 
what means the Reason of men became so deprav’d, as to think of subordinate Deitys, how the 
                                                          
61 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 69: ‘PRES.: Laws framed by Men, are neither clear, nor universal; nor always the 
same, nor ever efficacious.  RESP.: They are therefore useful to few, or wholly to none.  Interpreters alone 
excepted’. 
62 John Toland, Pantheisticon, 76: ‘you may perceive that their religion is simple, clear, easy, without blemish, 
and freely bestowed; not painted over, nor intricate, embarrassed, incomprehensible, or mercenary’. 
63 On the significance of this original primitive religion for the Deists and Freethinkers see Herrick, Radical 
Rhetoric, 30-31; Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft, 133-137, 140-160; Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions, 61-
73; Levine, Pantheism, 224-226.   
64 See John Toland, Nazarenus; ‘Primitive religion’ and ‘Critical History’, in Des Maizeaux, Collection. 
65 John Toland, Letters to Serena, II.28, quoting Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, I.38; Letters to Serena, II.46, 
quoting Tusculanae Disputationes, I.36; Letters to Serena, III.77-80, quoting De Divinatione, II.4. 
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Worship of many Gods was first introduc’d into the world, and what induc’d Men to pay Divine 
Honors to their Fellow-Creatures, whether on Earth or in the Heavens’.66  The existence of 
religious knowledge amongst the pagans prior to the institutions of religion was wielded as 
proof of the rational nature of true religion. 
Toland also used the argument that a rational religion should be accessible to the reason 
of all against the place of fables, myths and mysteries in religion.67  Toland’s most notable 
work on this subject was Christianity not Mysterious, and the subsequent Defence of that work, 
in which the presence of mysteries in Christianity was vigorously condemned.68  Such 
inventions were accused of being a way of obscuring religion from man’s reason, and therefore 
cannot count as true religion.  In order to demonstrate this, in Clidophorus Toland drew 
extensively on Cotta’s arguments intended to disprove Stoic fables: ‘they were too sagacious 
to admit the truth of such things in the literal sense, and too prudent to reject them all as 
nonsense: which led them of course, by the principle of self-preservation, to impose upon them 
a tolerable sense of their own; that they might not be deem’d wholly to deny the Religion in 
vogue, but to differ onely from others about the design and interpretation of it’.69  Toland then 
quotes Cotta’s accusation that such fables are perpetuated by the Stoics who attempt to develop 
these fables as divine explanations for natural occurrences, thereby inhibiting the access of 
men’s reason.70  Toland concludes that ‘the same CICERO does often elsewhere express his 
                                                          
66  John Toland, Letters to Serena, II.69-70. 
67 John Toland, Two Essays, 29-31; ‘Clidophorus; or of the Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy’, in John Toland, 
Tetradymus (London, 1720), 79-80, 87; ‘Critical History’, in Des Maizeaux, Collection, I.40.  See Harrison, 
‘Religion’ and the Religions, 14-18. 
68 Champion, Republican Learning, 83.   
69 John Toland, ‘Clidophorus’, in Tetradymus, 91-92.   
70 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, III.63. 
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aversion to Fables; as being, if not the parents, yet certainly the fosterers of Superstition’.71  A 
true religion has no need for such fabrications, as it is fully accessible to the reason of men. 
Cicero’s works, as read by Toland, contributed vital strategies to his war on priestcraft.  
In them, Toland found a definition of superstition which could be used to condemn priestcraft.  
Moreover, he found the argument that a true religion must be purged of superstitions, as a true 
religion is rational, justifying his campaign against the power of the clergy.  Ciceronian 
superstitio and religio, and their separation, prove essential constituents of Toland’s war on 
priestcraft. 
5. A Rational Religion and the State 
There is one last statement in De Divinatione which proves important to Toland’s war on 
priestcraft: ‘multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamur, si eam funditus 
sustulissemus’.72  The eradication of superstition becomes then not only a philosophical act, 
intended to purify religion, but a practical act, intended to contribute to the res publica.  
Toland’s war on priestcraft was a constituent of his broader republican project; he too 
conceived of this attack on the clergy as not only philosophical but practical, intended to serve 
the Commonwealth.  But how was stripping religion of its superstitious elements, whether that 
be divination or priestcraft, a service to the state?  
5.1. Endorsing a Civil Religion 
The character of Marcus Cicero in De Divinatione shows himself to be aware of a fundamental 
contradiction in his argument: while questioning the legitimacy of divinatory practices 
fundamental to traditional Roman religion in this work, he was engaging in these practices 
                                                          
71 John Toland, ‘Clidophorus’, in Tetradymus, 91-92. 
72 Cicero, De Divinatione, 537, (II.148): 'for I thought that I should be rendering a great service to myself and my 
country if I could tear this superstition up by the roots'. 
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publicly, both as an augur and as an orator.73  For Cicero, private doubts about the validity of 
certain religious practices did not necessarily equate to the rejection of public religion.74  Cicero 
repeatedly acknowledges throughout the second book of De Divinatione the vital function 
played by a public religion in society, in particular a religion controlled by the state.75  Cicero 
does not attempt to deny his recognition of the political necessity of certain divinatory 
practices: ‘ut ordiar ab haruspicina, quam ego rei publicae causa communisque religionis 
colendam censeo’.76  Similar statements occur concerning the haruspices and even augury, in 
spite of Cicero’s position as an augur.77  Cicero recognised the importance of piety for social 
order, due to the influence of religion on the masses, and as a result demonstrated respect for 
traditional Roman institutions not just in De Divinatione, but as Cotta in De Natura Deorum: 
‘harum ego religionum nullam umquam contemnendam putavi, mihique ita persuasi, Romulum 
auspiciis Numam sacris constitutis fundamenta iecisse nostrae civitatis, quae numquam 
profecto sine summa placatione decrum immortalium tanta esse potuisset’.78  The Cicero 
                                                          
73 Cicero, De Divinatione, II.45-46, 54, 70, 140.  In his speeches, Cicero regularly invoked traditional Roman 
practices to strengthen his argument; cf. Pro Sestio, 98; De Domo Sua, 7; Pro Flacco, 67; Pro Fonteio, 47; De 
Haruspicum Responsis, 18-19. 
74 This separation of public and private beliefs is a prominent feature of Toland’s Pantheism, see Pantheisticon, 
78, and ‘Clidophorus’, in Tetradymus, 94; cf. Harrison, ‘Religion’ and the Religions, 85-92, Stephen Daniel, ‘The 
subversive philosophy of John Toland’, in Paul Hyland and Neil Sammells, Irish Writing: exile and subversion 
(Basingstoke, 1991), 1-12, and Gavina Cherchi, ‘Atheism, dissimulation and atomism in the philosophy of John 
Toland’, PhD. Dissertation (London, 1994), 61-69. 
75 Fott, ‘Political-philosophical character’, 168-174; Robert J. Goar, Cicero and the State Religion (Amsterdam, 
1972), 29-33; Krostenko, ‘Beyond (Dis)belief’, 353-355. 
76 Cicero, De Divinatione, 401, (II.28): ‘I shall begin with soothsaying, which, according to my deliberate 
judgement, should be cultivated from reasons of political expediency and in order that we may have a state 
religion’. 
77 See Cicero, De Legibus, II.31-33; De Divinatione, II.70, 75. 
78 Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 289-291, (III.5): ‘well, I have always thought that none of these departments of 
religion was to be despised, and I have held the conviction that Romulus by his auspices and Numa by his 
establishment of our ritual laid the foundations of our state, which assuredly could never have been as great as it 
is had not the fullest measure of divine favour been obtained for it’; cf. Goar, Cicero and Religion, 114-120. 
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identified by Toland in De Divinatione and De Natura Deorum made a compelling advocate 
for the utility of a civil religion. 
 This is reflected once more in Toland’s own works, in which he elevates Cicero as a 
favoured source for the necessity of a state-controlled public religion.  In the opening passages 
of Toland’s Origines Judiciae, the work in which Toland sought to politicise Moses and the 
origins of Christianity, Toland drew extensively on Cicero to make the case that religion was 
necessary to the state, on account of its ability to influence the masses: ‘fateris (Auguste 
dulcissime) me recte omnino affirmare, in Adeisidaemone meo, nobiliores fere omnes et 
doctiores Romanos, Cultum sacrum, a Numa Pompilio traditum, vel tradi creditum, pro Politico 
habuisse Commento; et, ut cum Cicerone loquar, eos persuasos fuisse totam de Diis 
immortalibus opinionem, fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus Reipublicae causa: UT QUOS 
RATIO NON POSSET, EOS AD OFFICIUM RELIGIO DUCERET’.79  Toland then quotes 
in full a passage from the second book of De Divinatione which reiterates the point that religion 
served the state by means of influencing the masses, and that as a result the practice of augury 
should be maintained, provoking an exclamation from Toland regarding the fact that this was 
being acknowledged by someone who was an augur himself.80  As a final confirmation, Toland 
once more quotes the relevant section of the favoured passage from the end of De Divinatione, 
in which Cicero explicitly states that the rationalisation of religion will serve the state.  Toland 
concludes that ‘hoc et de me quoque diligentissime intelligi volo, cum impugnando 
                                                          
79 John Toland, Origines Judiciae, 101-102, quoting Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 113, (I.118): ‘you acknowledge 
(sweetest August) that I altogether rightly confirmed, in my Adeisidaemon, that all the more noble and more 
learned Romans held that the sacred Cult, handed down, or believed to have been handed down, by Numa 
Pompilius, was a political invention; and, as I say with Cicero, they had been persuaded that the entire nation of 
immortal gods is a fiction invented by wise men in the interest of the state, to the end that those whom reason was 
powerless to control might be led in the path of duty by religion’; cf. Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft, 173-179, 
186-195, and ‘Legislators, impostors, and the politic origins of religion’, 333-334. 
80 Cicero, De Divinatione, II.70, quoted in Toland, Origines Judiciae, 101-103. 
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Superstitionem, Religionem propugnare sit unicum mihi’.81  Toland found in his reading of 
Cicero an understanding of the practical necessity of a public religion which cohered with his 
own goals; the attack on priestcraft was not an attack on religion or the Church as such, but a 
necessary step in the pursuit of a civil religion, for liberated from the false authority of the 
clergy, there was nothing to prevent the Church being subsumed into the state. 
5.2. Anticlericalism as a Service to the State 
The campaign against priestcraft waged so assiduously was all in the pursuit of this goal, just 
as Cicero’s elimination of superstition was in the service of the state.  The false authority of 
the clergy was central to the claim made by the ecclesiastical establishment that it was 
independent from the authority of the state: ‘first, I mean those who sawcily strike at the 
Queen’s Supremacy, by asserting the Independency of the Church upon the State, calling their 
own Decrees thundering Anathemas, Sentences ratify’d in Heaven, and which they defy any 
Power on Earth to reverse’.82  Toland was greatly perturbed by the threat posed to the 
constitution of the Commonwealth by this belief in the Church’s independence from state 
authority.  The association of the Tories with the High Church Anglicans had already done 
much to confirm his fears; the influence granted to this element of the Church had resulted in 
political power for the House of Convocation, Acts of Conformity, and the crisis of the trial of 
Sacheverell.83  Most outrageous to Toland was the clergy’s amenability to absolute power, 
which led them to preach divine right and and passive obedience in return for the influence in 
the civil sphere.84  Toland envisaged a different public religion in the Commonwealth: 
                                                          
81 John Toland, Origines Judiciae, 103: ‘and I want this also to be understood about me most carefully, since 
Superstition must be attacked, Religion alone shall be defended by me’. 
82 John Toland, Appeal, 36-37. 
83 On these historical developments see particulalry Geoffrey Holmes, The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell (London, 
1973), and John Kenyon, Revolution Principles: the politics of party 1689 – 1720 (Cambridge, 1977), 128-145.  
84 John Toland, Appeal, 45-48; cf. Art of Governing, 14-15 and Anglia Libera, 177-190. 
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‘Religion it self is not more natural to Man, than it is for every Government to have a national 
Religion, or som public and orderly Way of worshipping God, under the Allowance, 
Involvement, and Inspection of the civil Magistrat’.85  By eradicating priestcraft Toland hoped 
to create a rational religion which rather than undermining the Commonwealth could be 
employed in its service. 
 It is not only the relationship of the Church with the constitution of the Commonwealth 
which motivates Toland’s rationalisation of religion, but its relationship with society.  Once 
the special authority of the clergy is eradicated, their spiritual tyranny over the citizens of the 
Commonwealth could be ended, allowing a rational and virtuous community to develop, vital 
to the survival of the Commonwealth.86  Toland believed a civil religion would invite a different 
form of piety: ‘according to this model, the Christian Worship does not consist (it seems) in 
stately Edifices, sumptuous Altars, numerous Attendants, gorgeous Habits, exquisite Musick, 
or a curiously contriv’d, expensive, and ceremonious service, supported by ample revenues and 
possessions...a man’s behaviour, and not the cant of a party, not the particular garbs or customs 
of any place, but the goodness and sincerity of his actions, wou’d be the real test of his 
Religion’.87  The measure of a man’s faith would become his actions and his virtue, making 
him a more useful member of the Commonwealth.  It is to Cicero once more that Toland turns 
to express the consequences of this modification for the clergy’s influence over society: 
‘Cicero, I say, telling those Priests to their faces, that, if they wou’d go about to defend those 
things by Divine Religion, which were condemn’d by Human Equity, what wou’d be the 
consequence, thus accosts them; if you shou’d do this we must look out for other Ceremonies, 
                                                          
85 John Toland, Anglia Libera, 95-96; cf. Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft, 179-186, and Republican Learning, 
141-142. 
86 John Toland, The State-Anatomy of Great Britain (London, 1717), 19; cf. Pagden, Languages of Political 
Theory, 6-11. 
87 John Toland, ‘Primitive Constitution’, in Des Maizeaux, Collection, II.145-146; cf. Clito, 17.  
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for other Priests of the immortal Gods, for other Expounders of Religions.  This is in our stile, 
we must look out for another Liturgy, for other Bishops, and for other Preachers’.88 
 Toland’s reading of Cicero provided him with one final weapon in his war on 
priestcraft: it provided the means to portray his efforts as part of the greater good.  The 
Commonwealth would benefit, as would its citizens; Toland’s anticlericalism was part of a 
republican project, designed for the protection and perpetuation of a constitution directed 
towards the defence of its people’s liberties. 
6. Conclusion 
Toland’s invocations of Cicero throughout his anticlerical works are not merely rhetorical 
flourishes; he was actively adapting the Ciceronian tradition into a weapon for radical, rational 
discourse, and using it accordingly to strengthen his own arguments.  This is evident in his 
efforts to legitimise a reading of Cicero’s theological works which identified Cicero’s voice 
with the arguments of the Academic Sceptic school, so that the aspects of those texts which 
were useful to Toland’s arguments could be imbued with Ciceronian authority.  It is further 
evident in the use to which Toland puts this interpretation of Cicero: he condemns priestcraft 
as a superstition by identifying it with Ciceronian superstitio; he uses Cicero’s separation of 
superstitio and religio to demonstrate that priestcraft has no place in a true religion; finally, he 
uses Cicero’s argument that the elimination of such superstitions is a service to the state to 
show that a civil religion is in the best interests of the Commonwealth.  In both principle and 
practice, Toland repeatedly invokes Ciceronian ideas, and their associated authority, and uses 
them towards a radical goal. 
                                                          
88 John Toland, State-Anatomy, 80-81, quoting Cicero, De Domo Sua, 2. 
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 It is the extent to which Toland actively engaged with the Ciceronian tradition and 
adapted it for radical purposes that poses a challenge to the assumptions of the Radical 
Enlightenment narrative.  The portrayal of the Early Enlightenment as a period which rejected 
all forms of authority and tradition in favour of philosophical reason, contributing to the decline 
of the Ciceronian tradition, is undermined by the efforts of a figure strongly associated with 
the radical identity of the period.  Toland’s use of Cicero reveals him not rejecting the past, and 
tradition, and authority, but instead adapting them for the construction of rational ideologies.  
The idea that tradition and reason were oppositional in the Early Enlightenment is therefore 
revealed as flawed; Toland’s adaptation of Cicero for his radical discourse shows that tradition 
and reason could function together in the formation of a new world.   
